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Abstract
This research adopted Personal Computer Transient Analyzer- Advanced Boiling Water 
Reactor version (PCTran-ABWR) simulation computer code to analyze the software safety 
issue for a generic ABWR. A number of postulated instrumentation and control (I&C) system 
software failure events were derived to perform the dynamic analyses. The basis of event 
derivation includes the published classification for software anomalies, the digital I&C design 
data of ABWR, chapter 15 accident analysis of generic safety analysis report (SAR), and the 
reported nuclear power plant I&C software failure events. For the purpose of enhancing the 
ABWR major control systems simulation capability, this research incorporated MATLAB into 
PCTran-ABWR to improve the pressure control system, feedwater control system, 
recirculation control system, and automated power regulation control system. As a result, the 
software failure of these digital control systems can be properly simulated and analyzed. 
Moreover, via an internal tuning technique, the modified PCTran-ABWR can precisely reflect 
the characteristics of the power-core flow map. Hence, in addition to transient plots, the 
analysis results can then be demonstrated on the Power-Core Flow Map. The case study of 
this research includes (1) the software common mode failures analysis for the major digital 
control systems; and (2) postulated ABWR digital I&C software failure events derivation from 
the actual happening of non-ABWR digital I&C software failure events, which were reported 
to Licensee Event Report (LER) of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) or Incident 
Reporting System (IRS) of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These events were 
analyzed by PCTran-ABWR. Conflicts among plant status, computer status, and human 
cognitive status are successfully identified. The operator might not easily recognize the 
abnormal condition, because the computer status seems to progress normally. However, a 
well trained operator can become aware of the abnormal condition with the inconsistent 
physical parameters; and then can take early corrective actions to avoid the system hazard. 
This paper also discusses the advantage of Simulation-based method, which can investigate 
more in-depth dynamic behavior of digital I&C system than other approaches. Some 
unanticipated interactions can be observed by this method.
1. Introduction
A generic ABWR design nuclear power plant (NPP) usually adopts fully digitalized 
I&C system. However, due to the complexity of software behavior, the failure modes of 
digital I&C system are different from that of analog I&C system. Branch Technical 
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Position (BTP)-14, “Guidance on Software Reviews for Digital Computer-Based 
Instrumentation and Control Systems,”[1] requests Software Verification and Validation 
(SV&V) and Software Configuration Management (SCM) for improving software 
reliability, and Software Safety Analysis (SSA) for enhancing system safety. Due to the 
potential residual software flaw is impossible to be totally eliminated, identifying the 
hazard for digital I&C system failure by software safety analysis is crucial. The NPP 
can be improved to become more robust to defend the digital I&C failure based on the 
findings of hazard identification. Annex D of IEEE 7.4.3.2-2003, “Identification and 
resolution of hazards [2],” proposes several hazard identification techniques. The 
technique of this research can be classified as Simulator/ Plant Model Testing technique. 
PCTran-ABWR is utilized as the plant simulation tool, which was extended and 
improved for resolving the software safety issue of ABWR. 
2. Hazard Identification Platform
PCTran-ABWR code was developed to evaluate the transients and accidents of 
ABWR. Since each component is appropriately simplified, this nuclear power plant 
simulation computer code can run faster than real time. The major components of the 
nuclear plant are included in the code. Hence, it can be treated as a small scale plant 
simulator. For the specific SSA purpose, this research extended or enhanced some of the 
models in PCTran-ABWR. MATLAB was incorporated with PCTran-ABWR to perform 
recirculation flow control and reactor power control. On recirculation control panel, 
Reactor Internal Pump (RIP) speed control mode and recirculation flow control mode 
can be switched by operator or the system. When in recirculation flow control mode, the 
RIP speed is adjusted to change the core flow in order to meet core flow demand by an 
MATLAB Proportional-Integral (PI) controller. On control rod control panel, rod 
position control mode and reactor power control mode can be switched by operator or 
the system. When in reactor power control mode, the control rod position is adjusted to 
change the reactor power in order to meet reactor power demand by an MATLAB PI 
controller.
When changing the core flow or control rod position of the original PCTran-ABWR 
model, the path can not precisely follow the power-flow map of the code. This research 
developed a set of tuning process to fit the power-flow map, and also developed a 
dynamic power-flow map to demonstrate the analysis result. Under this tuning process, 
the core flow under specific combination of reactor power, lumped control rod position, 
and lumped RIP speed was used to fit the power-core flow map. The equations for 
computing neutron power were not changed in the process. Thereby; the energy balance 
is kept as the original. The reactor core flow was separated as the natural convection 
term and forced convection term: 
Wcore = Wcore, natural + Wcore, forced ,   (1) 
where Wcore is the Rx core flow, Wcore, natural and Wcore, forced are the natural convection 
term and the forced convection term of Rx core flow. The natural convection term, PRx.,
is a function of Rx power. 
Wcore, natural = C1iuPRx + C2i ,  for i = 1 to 3 (2) 
where C1i and C2i are the coefficients to fit the natural circulation line of the power-
flow map. Three straight-line segments connect this curve; i denote the straight-line 
segment number. C1i and C2i are varied with each segment i. On the natural circulation 
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line, the RIP speed equals zero. The forced convection term equals to a RIP speed 
function multiplied by a control rod position function. 
Wcore, forced = Fun(ZRIP, 100%rod line)uMfun(Yrod) , (3) 
where ZRIP, 100%rod line stands for RIP speed on 100% control rod line, Fun(ZRIP, 100%rod 
line) is an interpolation function of forced convection core flow on 100% control rod line. 
Mfun(Yrod) is a multiplier function of control rod position. This research replaces the 
momentum equation by fitting the Power-Flow Map to obtain a precise core flow rate, 
which allows PCTran-ABWR to demonstrate dynamic analysis results on the Power-
Flow Map.
3. Software Common Mode Failure Events Analysis 
Two software common mode failures of the major digital control systems, which 
include feedwater control system and pressure control system, were analyzed. 
3.1. Feedwater Controller Failure—Maximum Demand 
For most of the Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs), feedwater pumps are controlled by 
one feedwater demand. As a result, single failure or software common mode failure of 
feedwater controller can induce error speed of all feed water pumps. Although the 
actual feedwater flow capacity is 110%, for conservative assumption, this research 
assumes the maximum feedwater flow can reach 130%. With excess feedwater flow, the 
water level rises to Level 8, the feedwater pumps and the main turbine are tripped at the 
time. No scram occurs due to fast opening of turbine bypass valves. Reactor water level 
finally drops to Level 3 and triggers reactor scram. Table 1 shows the event sequence. 
Fig. 1 shows the trend plot of reactor neutron flux, peak fuel temp, average surface heat 
flux, feedwater flow, vessel steam flow, core inlet flow, pump flows, and reactor water 
level.
Table 1 Sequence of Feedwater Controller Failure - Maximum Demand Events 
Event Time (sec) 
Event initiated  0
L8 vessel level set point initiates trip of main turbine and feedwater pumps. 17.5
Water level drops to low water level set point (Level 3) and reactor scram and trip of 4 RIPs 
are initiated. 
28.0
Fig. 1 Trend Plot of Feedwater Controller Failure-Maximum Demand 
3.2. Load Rejection with Failure of All Bypass Valves 
For an ordinary BWR plant, the main condenser is capable of condensing less than 
50% steam flow direct from reactor. Consequently, when a load rejection impacts the 
BWR plant, the reactor should scram to maintain the safety. However, the analyzed 
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ABWR type nuclear power plant owns a high capability main condenser, which allows 
110% steam to dump through the turbine bypass valves. If a load rejection impacts this 
power plant, instead of reactor scram, the pressure control system would open all the 
turbine bypass valves, the recirculation pumps run-back, and performing “Selected 
Control Rod Run-in” (SCRRI) to 60% control rod line. However, if one or more than 
one turbine bypass valves fail to properly open, the reactor protection system will 
initiate reactor scram, and safety/relief valves will open due to high pressure. The triplet 
fault tolerant digital controller design can effectively prevent Steam Bypass and 
Pressure Control System (SBPC) from software single failure. However, all the turbine 
bypass valves might fail to properly open simultaneously due to software common mode 
failure. Table 2 shows the event sequence. Fig. 2 shows the trend plot of reactor neutron 
flux, peak fuel temp, average surface heat flux, feedwater flow, and vessel steam flow.  
Table 2 Sequence of Load Rejection with Failure of All Bypass Valves 
Event Time (sec) 
Turbine-generator load rejection sensing devices trip to initiate TCVs fast closure  0
Turbine bypass valves fail to operate. 0
Trip of 4 RIPs initiated 0.5
Safety/relief valves open due to high pressure. 2
Safety/Relief valves close. 18
Fig. 2 Trend Plot of Generator Load Rejection with Failure of All Bypass Valves  
4. Reported Events Derivation
Event derivation from actual happening of non-ABWR digital I&C software failure 
events, which were reported to LER of USNRC or IRS of IAEA on ABWR are also 
performed as follows. 
4.1. BROWNS FERRY (USA) Unit 2 Scram Due to FW System Reinitializing Feed 
Pump Demand Output Signal to Zero 
On May 10, 1996, Browns Ferry Unit 2 (BWR) experienced an automatic reactor 
scram on low reactor water level from full power (LER No. 1996-005). The document is 
described as follows: “The low water level resulted from an unexpected runback of two 
of the three reactor feedwater pumps, which occurred while software parameter changes 
were being made in the recently installed digital feedwater control system. Specifically, 
the flow biasing of the feedwater pumps was being adjusted and the control system 
speed demand limit was being increased while at power in an effort to fine tune the 
system and thereby enhance system performance. When the software parameter changes 
were saved in the control system, a re-initialization sequence occurred within the 
control software block, which drove the feed pump speed demand signal to zero for a 
few seconds. Plant personnel were unaware that entering these new software parameters 
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would cause the feedwater control system to reinitialize. The cause of the event was 
attributed to inadequate design of the control system software. The system software 
contains 380 software blocks, that is, logic functions performed by the computer. A 
design weakness existed in the installed system in that making software parameter 
changes in certain software blocks would cause the control system to automatically 
reinitialize to zero output.” 
Two turbine-driven feed water pumps, FWP A and FWP B, are designed to operate in 
normal operation condition of ABWR, each pump owns 55% flow capability. In the 
postulated event, maintenance personnel adjust and save parameters on line at 100% 
reactor power and 100% core flow. This action activates a residual software defect in 
digital control system, which induces re-initialization of feed water control system, and 
leads to run-back of FWP B for 10 seconds. This event assumes no motor-driven pump 
initiation to compensate feed water flow and no recirculation pumps runback to reduce 
the reactor power. FWP A raises the flow rate to its maximum capability, 55%, 2580 
lbm/sec, based on feed water flow demand (see Fig. 3). Due to the steam flow still 
maintains nearly 100% flow rate, the water level reduces to 373.4 cm before FWP B 
restarts (see Fig. 6), only 8.8 cm higher than Level 3, the low water level for reactor trip. 
Re-initialization is a vivid issue of digital I&C system software design. In addition to 
modifying parameters on line, to re-install digital equipment on line also could induce 
this problem. In general, the default value (or pre-defined value) could be different from 
the on line operation value. It could induce unexpected transients or unnecessary reactor 
scrams. The designer should carefully arrange the parameter to close to the operation 
value if on line maintenance is required.  
4.2. Washington Nuclear Project 2 (USA) Problems Associated with Testing, 
Tuning, or Resetting of Digital Control Systems while at power Description of 
Circumstances 
On July 20, 1996, the WNP-2 (BWR) facility experienced a rapid change in power of 
15 percent in a 40-second time frame (USNRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-56). The 
document is described as follows: “Specifically, power dropped from 68 to 53 percent 
and returned to 68 percent. The licensee determined that the power transient resulted 
from testing of the recently installed digital adjustable speed drive modification to the 
reactor recirculation pumps. Before the event, the licensee was preparing to increase 
reactor recirculation flow from 51% to 53%. As part of the preparation, a non licensed 
General Electric (GE) test engineer typed computer instructions that would return the 
reactor recirculation flow to 51% if electrical harmonics were experienced in the 
adjustable speed drive system during the reactor recirculation flow increase. Once these 
instructions were typed, an operator would verify the entry and only had to strike the 
"ENTER" key on the computer keyboard to execute the instruction. It was intended that 
the licensed operator would only hit the ENTER key and execute the instruction if the 
system started to experience electrical harmonics as reactor recirculation flow was 
increased. In this instance, the GE engineer typed an incorrect value and then 
mistakenly executed the instruction by striking the ENTER key. These actions caused 
reactor recirculation flow and reactor power to drop. Immediately after entering the data, 
the GE engineer recognized the error and corrected the instruction, thereby increasing 
reactor power.” 
In the derivation event on ABWR, the operators attempt to raise the core flow from 
51% to 53%. Owing to mistaken operation, the recirculation pumps run-back to the 
minimum speed 31%, the engineer soon recognizes the mistake, and increases reactor 
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power to the original operation point. Fig. 4 shows the path on power-core flow map. 
The core flow drops to 44% along the 100% control rod line after the operator takes the 
wrong action. The core flow increase 61.6% along the 100% control rod line after the 
operator takes the corrective actions. Fig. 7 is the trend plot of reactor power and core 
flow. No significant hazard is identified in this event. The hazard of transient is 
enveloped by that of recirculation run-back from 100% power/100% core flow. In 
addition to enhancing the operator training, confirmation should be taken by operator, 
e.g. via a dialogue box, before the action might induce large transient. 
4.3. Darlington (Canada) Unit 2 Loss of Regulation (LOR) from Low Power  
This Darlington (Canada) Unit 2 (PHWR, CANDU) event occurred on 15 November 
1992 (IRS No. 1360). The document is described as follows: “The reactor had been out 
of service for more than a year and staffs were in the process of restarting the reactor. 
Criticality had been reached and reactor power was at -3 decades (0.001). Reactor 
power started to increase unexpectedly and the reactor regulating system (RRS) initiated 
a step-back on high log rate of power increase. It caused a step-back by partially 
inserting the mechanical control absorbers (MCAs). After a series of MCAs inserted and 
withdrawn, the reactor was eventually shut down due to violation of the power limit. As 
two ion chamber (IC) signals may fall below acceptable ranges. Thus a patch is put in 
the software to tell the RRS to bypass the rationality checks. This means that the RRS 
will always select the middle signal. In this case, the reactor was restarted with the 
patch still in place. In addition, channel B IC had a faulty diode in its amplifier, which 
caused channel B to always read -4.1 decades (7.94×10-5). If the patch had not been in 
place, and with channel A out of service, the RRS would have used the higher IC 
reading, which would have been channel C, the only IC which was, in fact, working. 
Start up would have proceeded normally. As the jumper had been left in place, it saw 
channel C reading high, channel A reading -7.9 decades (1.26×10-8), and it selected 
channel B as the middle reading channel. Channel B was, in fact stuck, at -4.1 decades, 
so the RRS kept removing negative reactivity in an attempt to increase power to the 
required -3 decades (0.001). According to its sensor (IC channel B), power did not 
increase, so more and more negative reactivity was removed until the actual rate of 
increase in power caused a step-back.” 
For a generic ABWR, four divisions of APRM signal are available for fault tolerant 
digital design, which can effective prevent software single failure. Automatic start-up 
can also be prohibited by inconsistence of the APRM signals. However, software 
common mode failure could defeat this level of defense. In the derivation event on 
ABWR, a conversion problem is assumed to induce error APRM reading, which is 50% 
of real APRM value. Therefore, the error process can successfully perform (1) 
withdrawing control rods to reach 40% measured power, (2) speeding up recirculation 
pump to reach 60% core flow, then (3) trying to reach 100% control rod line and fully 
withdrawing control rods(see Fig. 5). This case also assumes the operator does not find 
out the abnormal condition until the control rods are fully withdrawn. Eventually, the 
operator decreases the recirculation pump speed to minimum speed, 31% (Phase 4 in Fig. 
5), and then fully inserts all the control rods (Phase 5 in Fig. 5) to terminate the event. 
Fig. 8 shows the conflict between actual reactor power and measured reactor power for 
each phase. Fig. 9 shows the conflicts among plant, computer, and human status. The 
operator might not easily recognize the abnormal condition, because the automatic start-
up process seems to progress normally. However, a well trained operator can become 
aware of the abnormal condition with high steam flow, high reactor pressure, or over 
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withdrawn control rod position which are not comparative with measured reactor power, 
and then takes early corrective actions to avoid the cladding damage hazard. 
Fig. 3 Deriving Browns Ferry Event on 
ABWR- FWP A and FWP B flow rate 
Fig. 4 Deriving WNP-2 Event on ABWR- 
Power-Core Flow Map 
Fig. 5 Deriving Darlington Event on ABWR 
- Reactor Power and Core Flow 
Fig. 6 Deriving Browns Ferry Event on 
ABWR- Reactor Water Level 
Fig. 7 Deriving WNP-2 Event on ABWR- 
Reactor Power and Core Flow 
Fig. 8 Deriving Darlington Event on ABWR - 
Reactor power Trend Plot 
Plant Status Computer Status 
Human cognitive Status (Take late action) Human cognitive Status  (Take early action) 
Fig. 9 Conflicts among plant, computer, and operator status 
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5. Conclusion
Simulation-based method can investigate more in-depth dynamic behavior of digital 
I&C system than other approaches. Some unanticipated interactions can be observed by 
this method, if the model is detailed enough. The analysis of software common mode 
failures of the major digital control systems demonstrates the ability of PCTran-ABWR. 
The ABWR event derivation from reported events demonstrates the ability to identify 
system hazard, which is induced by software defect. Furthermore, conflicts among plant 
status, computer status, and human cognitive status are successfully identified. The 
operator might not easily recognize the abnormal condition, because the computer status 
seems to progress normally. However, a well trained operator can become aware of the 
abnormal condition with the inconsistent physical parameters; and then can take early 
corrective actions to avoid the system hazard. 
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